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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether or not the U.S. should ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention)' has been
debated since the treaty was concluded in 1982. UNCLOS itself is one of the
most significant achievements in international law in the Twentieth Century.
The Convention consists of 320 articles and eight annexes. It is comprehensive,
if not definitive, in its treatment of ocean usage. A hallmark of UNCLOS is the
balancing of interests between coastal states and other maritime users. From the
perspective of living marine resources such as fisheries, for example, UNCLOS
offers a balance between the conservation and utilization of those resources.
Without a doubt, UNCLOS contains numerous provisions addressing matters
of the marine environment.
This article attempts to highlight in very broad strokes some of the key
issues surrounding U.S. accession to UNCLOS, particularly with respect to the
marine environment. It is neither a comprehensive review of the treaty provi-
sions pertaining to the marine environment nor an exhaustive discussion of the
law and politics of the advice and consent process as it presently stands in the
U.S. Senate. With this parameter in mind, it is instructive to begin by
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1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered
into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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understanding the context of this most recent attempt at the codification of the
modem law of the sea.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF UNCLOS:
THE NEED FOR A BETTER TREATY
The need for a more comprehensive treatment of ocean space became
apparent after the four 1958 conventions (produced by UNCLOS I) did not
establish a sufficient legal order of the oceans. Although these treaties added
considerably to the ocean governance of the time, they were not entirely
successful because they were unable to fix the breadth of the territorial sea.
Following the inability of the 1960 conference (UNCLOS II) to improve
on the 1958 agreements, specifically the lack of agreement about the limit to the
territorial sea, in 1970 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2570
calling for a new conference (UNCLOS III) to produce a comprehensive treaty.2
From 1973 to 1982, multiple rounds of negotiation produced the bundle of com-
promises that is UNCLOS. The growing concern for the marine environment
of the 1970s was reflected in various parts of UNCLOS. The most significant
of which is Part XII entitled, "Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment." Numerous other provisions express concern for conservation
and sustainable use of resources. Of course, the marine environment was just
one of several aspects of ocean governance addressed by the Convention. Other
key aspects include allocation of maritime zones, delimitation of maritime
boundaries, navigation and overflight, mineral exploitation, marine scientific
research, recognition of authority to exercise prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction, the settlement of disputes and many others.
III. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF UNCLOS AND ITS OBJECTIVES
The most basic goal of UNCLOS is to divide the ocean into maritime zones
that more or less allocate the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and
other maritime users in those zones. Unlike its predecessors, UNCLOS adopted
a limit to the territorial sea. The territorial sea, out to a maximum of 12 nautical
miles, is adjacent to a state's coastline. It is that part of the ocean where the
coastal state enjoys its greatest rights for applying its prescriptive and enforce-
ment jurisdiction, providing for its defense, exploiting its marine resources and
protecting its marine environment. In addition to the territorial sea, UNCLOS
provides for coastal states to have an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to a
maximum of 200 nautical miles. In the EEZ, the coastal state has considerable
authority to provide for the exploration, conservation, and utilization of
resources. In the EEZ the coastal state specifically has jurisdiction to protect
2. See R. R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 16 (3d. ed. 1999).
and preserve the marine environment.3 From the standpoint of fisheries, the
regime of the EEZ is significant not only because it allows the coastal state to
determine the allowable catch limits in these waters,4 but also because many
living marine resources are found within 200 miles of a coastline. Perhaps most
importantly, the regime of the EEZ allows coastal states to use their prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction to address a variety of environmental concerns in
what amount to wide sections of the ocean.
Apart from the allocation of maritime zones, some of the provisions
generally directed to the environment include Article 194, which requires states
to take action to prevent, reduce and control pollution. Article 195 requires
states to act so as not to transfer "damage or hazards" from one area to another.
UNCLOS addresses marine pollution originating from land-based sources, 5 sea-
bed activities,6 dumping,7 the ordinary operation of vessels,' and the atmos-
phere. 9 In addition, Articles 65 and 120 favor the conservation of marine
mammals, cetaceans in particular, over their exploitation.
A particular innovation of UNCLOS is its dispute settlement mechanism.
The dispute settlement provisions found in Part XV are flexible and can lead to
binding decisions. Part XV creates a tribunal, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which is dedicated to the interpretation and application
of UNCLOS. Under Part XV, UNCLOS members are permitted to designate
certain enumerated dispute settlement options should disputes arise with other
UNCLOS parties.
IV. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE AND PRESENT RATIFICATION STATUS
Understanding the U.S. history with the Convention is a useful starting
point to address the potential impact of the treaty on any number of maritime
uses. Although the U.S. participated in UNCLOS negotiations and achieved
many of its goals in those negotiations (most particularly with regard to navi-
gation and overflight rights for military vessels and aircraft), the U.S. ultimately
resisted ratification because of the perceived effect of Part XI governing the
deep sea-bed. Article 136 declares the resources of the deep sea-bed to be "the
common heritage of mankind."' This provision implied an obligation to share
3. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 56(b)(iii).
4. Id. art. 61(1).
5. Id. art. 207.
6. Id. art. 208 & 209.
7. Id. art. 210.
8. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 211.
9. Id. art. 212.
10. Id. art. 137.
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deep sea-bed resources in a manner that was objectionable to the U.S. and other
developed states. Despite this, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed that the
bulk of the substantive provisions of UNCLOS would be applied by the U.S. on
a provisional basis.
In 1994, in a separate agreement addressing the concerns of developed
states, a compromise was reached on access to deep sea-bed resources. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton signed this additional agreement and transferred it, along with
the main text of UNCLOS, to the Senate for Advice and Consent. The Senate
did not act on UNCLOS until 2003.
In October 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings
on U.S. ratification. All of the testimony taken by the Foreign Relations
Committee favored U.S. membership. Among the witnesses were John F.
Turner, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs of the State Department, and Roger Rufe,
President of the Ocean Conservancy. These witnesses highlighted some of the
ways in which UNCLOS contributes to the stewardship of the marine environ-
ment.' In March 2004, the Foreign Relations Committee ordered UNCLOS
reported to the full Senate. This included the attachment of 24 declarations and
understandings to accompany U.S. ratification.
At about the same time, the Environment and Public Works Committee
held additional hearings on UNCLOS. The stated purpose of these hearings was
to include some voices opposing U.S. ratification of the Convention.1 2 The
opponents emphasize the surrender of decision-making ability to the Sea-Bed
Authority provided for in Part XI and its accompanying agreement as well as the
potential impact of decisions by the ITLOS on U.S. activities. 13 In support of
the latter concern, it should be noted that even though the U.S. does not intend
to designate the ITLOS as a method of dispute settlement there are certain
circumstances under which it might still be subject to its jurisdiction.
As of November 2004, the full Senate had not yet voted on the question of
ratification, however, the proposed declarations and understandings of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 many of which address environmental
concerns, are worthy of review. At the outset, it is useful to recall that because
of the highly coordinated and integrated nature of its provisions, UNCLOS
11. The statements of these witnesses can be found at the. following website:
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/hrg03 1021 a.html (visited Nov. 13, 2004).
12. See Senator James M. Inhofe, Opening Statement, United States Senate Oversight Hearing to
Examine the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (March 24, 2004),
http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=219593.
13. See Frank Gaffhey, Jr., President and CEO, The Center for Security Policy, Statement at the
United States Senate Oversight Hearing to examine the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea"
(March 24, 2004), http://epw.senate.gov/hearingstatements.cfin?id=219549.
14. S. EXEC. DOC. No. 108-10, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (2004).
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specifically prohibits reservations." 5 On the other hand, UNCLOS does permit
a state, when signing, ratifying or acceding, to make "declarations or state-
ments" with a view to the harmonization of its domestic laws with the Conven-
tion. 6
V. PROPOSED DECLARATIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS
AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
The most substantive declaration proposed by the Senate addresses the
U.S. option for dispute settlement under Part XV. In this declaration, the U.S.
designates a "special arbitral tribunal" to hear disputes arising from the
Convention related to:
1) Fisheries;
2) Protection and preservation of the marine environment;
3) Marine scientific research; and
4) Navigation,
including pollution from vessels and by dumping. This type of declaration is
perfectly permissible under Article 287(1) of UNCLOS. For all remaining
disputes, the U.S. opts for arbitration. Arbitration is not only an option under
Article 287(1) but is also the default method of dispute settlement under the
treaty.
7
Another declaration proposed by the Senate that affects the environment
emphasizes the right to impose and enforce conditions for the entry of foreign
vessels into U.S. ports and internal waters. This declaration is specifically
directed at the introduction of alien species from ballast water discharge as well
as oil spills. In a similar declaration, the U.S. expresses the understanding that
UNCLOS supports the authority of a coastal state to regulate the introduction
of alien species into the marine environment. Another declaration emphasizes
the right of the coastal state to determine allowable catch limits of living
resources in its EEZ and to establish terms and conditions for access by other
states to those resources. This same declaration expresses the understanding
that these determinations are not subject to binding dispute resolution.
Still, another declaration asserts that Article 65, the UNCLOS provision
pertaining to conservation and management of marine mammals, lends direct
support to the present moratorium on commercial whaling and the establishment
of sanctuaries and other conservation measures. The same declaration also
asserts that states must cooperate with respect to all cetaceans not just large
ones. This declaration is a clear reference to the work of the International
15. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 309.
16. Id. art. 310.
17. Id. art. 287, paras. 3 & 5.
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Whaling Commission (IWC) although it does not identify the IWC by name.
To understand the context of this declaration, the moratorium on commercial
whaling, which has been in effect since the mid-i 980s, has come under assault
in recent years by pro-whaling states that find no basis in law for the
continuation of the moratorium. Furthermore, the reference to "all cetaceans"
not just large whales speaks to an ongoing debate in the IWC: that is, whether
or not the IWC is competent to regulate small cetaceans (i.e., dolphins and
porpoises) as well as the great whales. The effect of this declaration will likely
be to lend greater U.S. support to the efforts of the IWC which today has a
solidly conservationist agenda.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
By most accounts, U.S. ratification of UNCLOS will have a positive effect
on the environment. This is not because the U.S. will be binding itself to any
new substantive norms. On the contrary, most substantive provisions of
UNCLOS are already part of U.S. policy and have been for many years.
Despite this, the conservation of ocean wildlife, the protection of delicate
marine ecosystems, and the control of marine pollution are by their very nature
multilateral issues. U.S. ratification will demonstrate U.S. commitment to
address these problems in a cooperative manner at a time when some view U.S.
policy as generally antithetical to multilateral arrangements. The environmental
community strongly favors UNCLOS and U.S. ratification would send a
message of support.
Among the benefits the U.S. will receive from UNCLOS membership is
the ability to have a judge of U.S. nationality serve on the ITLOS and the right
to participate in the amendment process of the treaty as provided for in Article
312. The power to amend the treaty is vested in the parties 10 years after the
treaty has entered into force.18 The 10-year anniversary was November 16,
2004. The U.S. would be entering the game just as amendments become
possible. Admittedly, the question of amendment to such a comprehensive legal
instrument is fraught with difficulties, but U.S. membership ensures that any
future amendments will only be adopted when the U.S. is a full participant in
the process.
The U.S. has a golden opportunity to take a more respected leadership role
in ocean governance by embracing a treaty that offers a meaningful, if imper-
fect, framework for ocean governance. Even though the U.S. has already
proven its commitment to the marine environment and willingness to work both
independently and with responsible partners to achieve environmental goals,
U.S. ratification will highlight those objectives in international affairs. U.S.
18. Id. art. 312.
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ratification will energize and elevate the status of UNCLOS in international law.
Undoubtedly, the marine environment would be an immediate beneficiary of
U.S. participation.
